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The Vulnerable Dynamics of
Discourse
PAUL GILADI AND DANIELLE PETHERBRIDGE
Abstract
In this paper, we offer some compelling reasons to think that issues relating to
vulnerability play a significant – albeit thus far underacknowledged – role in
Jürgen Habermas’s notions of communicative action and discourse. We shall argue
that the basic notions of discourse and communicative action presuppose a robust
conception of vulnerability and that recognising vulnerability is essential for (i)
making sense of the social character of knowledge, on the epistemic side of things,
and for (ii) making sense of the possibility of deliberative democracy, on the political
side of things. Our paper is divided into four principal sections. In Section 1,
we provide a basic outline of Habermas on communicative action and discourse.
In Section 2, we develop an account of vulnerability and communication in the
context of speaker/hearer relations. We specifically focus on distorted communica-
tion, vulnerability and speech. In Section 3, we focus on elaborating epistemic
pathologies in the context of epistemic oppression and testimonial injustice.
In Section 4, we focus on explaining how Habermasian resources contribute to vul-
nerability theory, and how introducing vulnerability theory to Habermas broadens
or deepens his theory of communication action and his discourse ethics theory.
I have spread my dreams under your feet; Tread softly because you
tread on my dreams W.B. Yeats
1. Communicative Action and Discourse
Jürgen Habermas places significant philosophical as well as socio-
political emphasis on the intrinsically social character of language:
meaning, normativity, and knowledge are mediated by practices
that are rooted in communicative action.1 For Habermas, communi-
cative action is the type of action aimed at establishing consensus
(i.e. mutual understanding) through the agonistic establishment of
legitimate and valid norms for persons (i.e. language-using individuals).
As Habermas frames it:
1 By ‘normativity’, we mean the general idea of obligations, justifica-
tions, and values.
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The concept of communicative action presupposes language as
the medium for a kind of reaching understanding, in the course
of which the participants, through relating to a world, recipro-
cally raise validity claims that can be accepted or contested.
(Habermas, 1984, p. 99)
Communicative action is not modelled on any kind of instrumenta-
lised subject-object relationship and means-end framework. This is
because communicative action is the variety of activity constituted
byone of our knowledge-constitutive interests,2 namely communicative
interests: the function of communicative action is to interpret and to
bring about the intelligibility of concepts such as justice and goodness
under public reason. Communicative action, therefore, is directed at
ends-in-themselves and to realising an intersubjective relationship
between agents as much as possible. Specifically, the norms structur-
ing communicative action simultaneously concern three different
kinds of validity claims – a) claims to truth; b) claims to sincerity
(truthfulness), and c) claims to normative rightness.3 Tracing his
intellectual lineage to Fichte’s theory of recognition,4 G.H. Mead’s
pragmatist social psychology, and J.L. Austin’s speech act theory,
Habermas’s theory of communicative action draws on the following
claims from Fichte, Mead, and Austin respectively.
On the Fichtean side of things, the ‘I’must ‘posit’ (Setzen) itself as
an individual for the ‘I’ to be an individual. In order to posit itself as
an individual, the ‘I’must recognise itself as ‘summoned’ by another
individual. The summons (Aufforderung)5 of another individual
2 Viz. Habermas (1973, p. 196; p. 308).
3 By ‘normative rightness’, we take Habermas to refer to intersubject-
ively and communicatively constituted forms of moral obligation and
value orientations.
4 Crucially, what we have written here is not meant to either ignore or
downplay the significance of Hegel’s theory of recognition for Habermas’s
position. In his iconic essay ‘Labour and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel’s
Jena Philosophy of Mind’, Habermas identifies and lays out what he sees
as Hegel’s better conception of intersubjectivity than Fichte’s. From
Habermas’s perspective, given that Hegel – much like Fichte – articulates
the communicative normative content of modern ethical life inmetaphysical
ways, neglecting the pragmatic dimensions of language-use and communica-
tion, Hegel, at best, multiplies beyond necessity his development of a proto-
form of communicative rationality and action. Habermas construes his own
postmetaphysical model as Hegelian without any ‘metaphysical mortgages’
(Habermas, 1987b, p. 316).
5 Aufforderung ranges from ‘begging’ (bitten) to ‘demanding’
(verlangen).
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limits the freedom of the ‘I’ out of respect for the freedom of the
Other.6 Such a practice of mutual recognition between individuals is
a necessary condition for the possibility of personhood. On the
Meadian side of things, the practice of navigating one’s way in a
team/group by understanding the various roles and behavioural
habits/associations of ‘the generalised other’ enables a person to
develop self-consciousness, which involves the internalisation of so-
cialising practices.7 Mead’s well-known claim that individuation
occurs through socialisation and his focus on both gestural and lin-
guistic forms of interaction become central to Habermas’s own
theory. As Habermas writes:
I see the more far-reaching contribution of Mead in his having 
taken up themes [such] that … individuation is pictured not 
as the self-realisation of an independently acting subject 
carried out in isolation and freedom but as a 
linguistically mediated process of socialisation … Individuality 
forms itself in relations of intersubjective acknowledgement 
and of intersubjectively mediated self-understanding … Mead 
will shift all fundamental philosophical concepts from the basis 
of consciousness to that of language. (Habermas, 1992, pp. 152–
  8
In53;otherp. 162)words, Habermas contends that Mead is credited with the
foundational insight that language-use involves norms requiring dis-
cursive exchange, a variety of an I-thou relation, rather than the I-hey 
and/or I-it relation, and that the most basic linguistic unit is 'the 
relationship between ego’s speech-act and alter’s taking a 
position’ (Habermas, 1992, p. 163).
On the Austinian side of things, Habermas claims that ‘a turn to the 
pragmatics of language … concedes primacy to world-disclosing 
language – as the medium for the possibility of reaching understand-
ing, for social cooperation … – over world-generating subjectivity’ 
(Habermas, 1992, p. 153).9 Briefly put, Austin details three varieties 
of speech-acts,10 where the latter two are especially relevant for our 
concerns and for making sense of Habermasian communication 
(and discourse):
– Locutionary act: uttering the literal meaning (Bedeutung) of a  
statement – i.e. stating the pure semantic content of a proposition.
6 Viz. FNR (p. 31). Cf. Wood (2016, p. 83).
7 Viz. MSS (p. 154).
8 Cf. Taylor (1987, p. 13).
9 See also Habermas (1984, pp. 288–95); Habermas (1998, pp. 66–88).
10 See Austin (1975).
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E.g. ‘It’s rather nippy in Boston during winter’= ‘it’s very
cold in Boston during the winter months’
– Illocutionaryact: the intendedmeaning (Meinung) of the speaker
in the utterance of a sentence, namely the assertive/directive/
commissive/expressive/declarative features of that sentence.
E.g. ‘Jim, it’s rather nippy in Boston during winter’= ‘Jim,
please consider taking a down-coat with you when you travel to
Boston in the winter’.
– Perlocutionary act: the consequential effects of an illocution-
ary act.
E.g. After Sarah says ‘It’s rather nippy in Boston during
winter’ to Jim, Jim takes a down-coat with them when they
travel to Boston in the winter.
Habermas himself identifies only illocutionary acts with commu-
nicative action, as, in his view, these acts are orientated to reaching
mutual understanding and, in turn, such understanding is linked
to reaching agreement and ‘rationally motivated binding’ or ‘force’
(Habermas, 1984, p. 278). For Habermas, then, ‘communicative
agreement has a rational basis [and] it cannot be imposed by either
party, whether instrumentally through intervention in the situation
directly or strategically through influencing the decisions of
opponents’ (Habermas, 1984, p. 287). In illocutionary acts a
speaker partakes in communicative action in saying something such
that she lets a hearer know she wants to be understood, in a perlocu-
tionary act, the speaker aims to produce an effect on the hearer, and
‘thereby brings about something in the world’ (Habermas, 1984,
pp. 288–89). Thus, according to Habermas’s view, perlocutionary
acts are associated with an intention and are considered a form of
goal-directed action more generally. In Habermas’s schema, perlocu-
tionary acts then represent forms of strategic action given their intent
is to bring about some particular end, rather than merely a form of
communicative action directed toward mutual understanding.
Crucially, for Habermas, successful communication between
agents involves the hearer being able to transparently (and non-coer-
cively) grasp the reasons motivating the propositions put forward by
the speaker:
We understand a speech act when we know what makes it acceptable.
From the standpoint of the speaker, the conditions of acceptabil-
ity are identical to the conditions for his illocutionary success.
Acceptability is not defined here in an objectivistic sense, from
the perspective of an observer, but in the performative attitude
4












































of a participant in communication. (Habermas, 1984,
pp. 297–98; emphasis added)
The pragmatics of language do not only reveal how individuality is
mediated through a complex process of socialisation. Rather, illocut-
ionary acts also point to democratic potentialities. This is because
‘[w]henever the speaker enters into an interpersonal relationship
with a hearer, he also relates himself as an actor to a network of nor-
mative expectations’ (Habermas, 1992, p. 190). Linguistic practice
involves not just grasping the norms of assertion,11 it also involves,
to use Wilfrid Sellars’s expression, knowing how to move in the
space of reasons.12 Successful navigation in the space of reasons
requires grasping the plurality of communicative inferential commit-
ments and entitlements one has in the use of words.
Importantly, as mentioned above, for Habermas, the norms struc-
turing communicative action simultaneously concern three different
kinds of validity claims – claims to truth; claims to sincerity (truthful-
ness); claims to normative rightness –, which directly correspond to
three different kinds of formal ‘world’:
[I]n communicative action a speaker selects a comprehensible
linguistic expression only in order to come to an understanding
with a hearer about something and thereby tomake himself under-
standable. It belongs to the communicative intent of the speaker
(a) that he perform a speech act that is right in respect to the given
normative context, so that between him and the hearer an
intersubjective relation will come about which is recognised as
legitimate; (b) that he make a true statement …, so that the
hearer will accept and share the knowledge of the speaker; and
(c) that he express truthfully his beliefs, intentions, feelings,
desires, and the like, so that the hearer will give credence to
what is said. (Habermas, 1992, pp. 307–308)
By engaging in illocutionary speech-acts – the ‘bread and butter’ lin-
guistic practices of communicative action – (i) the intentional content
of a speaker’s propositions – i.e. to what the speaker is referring when
they say things – is automatically directed to a shared world of agents.
By virtue of, saying ‘please consider’, for example, the speaker is ‘at-
tempting to establish an interpersonal relation which the hearer will
recognise as legitimate’ (Niemi, 2005, p. 230); (ii) what the speaker is
referring to in practices of communicative action is an accessible,
11 Viz. Grice (1975, pp. 26–30).
12 Viz. Sellars (1991, p. 169).
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Paul Giladi and Danielle Petherbridge
objective world; (iii) the speaker, just by virtue of performing an illo-
cutionary speech-act (‘Jim, you should seriously consider taking a 
down-coat with you when you travel to Boston in the winter’) 
reveals a subjective world to the hearer. If Jim is to genuinely under-
stand Sarah’s advice, they must understand what it would mean to 
action her advice as well as understand that accepting Sarah’s 
speech then commits them to take a down-coat with them when 
they travel to Boston in the winter.
Crucially, the emphasis on communication transforms the subject 
of experience from being voyeuristic to actively engaged. Habermas’s 
position is, thus, allied with Kant’s notion of pragmatic anthropology, 
which draws a distinction between die Welt kennen and Welt haben: 
‘the expressions “to know the world” and “to have the world” are 
rather far from each other in their meaning, since one only under-
stands the play that one has watched, while the other has participated 
in it’ (APPV, [120], p. 4). This empowers human beings by regarding 
their communicative practices as authoritative, since it is only 
through successful discursive exchanges that one can meaningfully 
develop notions of autonomy and respect. As such, for a practical rela-
tion-to-self to be healthy requires progressive intersubjective rela-
tions, ones which engender and sustain autonomy and respect.
On the corresponding socio-political front, Habermas contends 
that all social processes are assessed with respect to how well (or in-
variably not) they foster communicability and the development of 
‘discourse’, namely non-coercive arenas for the agonistic, public use 
of reason. As he writes, ‘[an] ego-identity can only stabilise itself in 
the anticipation of symmetrical relations of unforced reciprocal rec-
ognition’ (Habermas, 1992, p. 188). Democracy and communication 
are necessarily tied together and mutually supporting: the failure to 
develop communicative action is a barrier to democracy in the 
public sphere, and the failure to develop democratic values is a 
barrier to communicative action.
In Habermas’s schema, when communicative practices fail or 
break down, participants can turn to discourse. Discourse, for 
Habermas, involves the public testing of claims to universal norma-
tive validity; as such, discourse is central to his modern critical 
social theory, to the extent that his discourse theory is effectively 
the rational reconstruction of Kant’s moral theory implicitly embed-
ded in the theory of communicative action. For Habermas, discourse 
comprises two key principles: the Discourse Principle (D) and the 
Universalisation Principle (U).
(D) concerns ‘[j]ust those action norms are valid to which all 













































discourses’ (Habermas, 1992, p. 107). In other words, valid norms
are not extra-human dictates handed down to us. Rather, valid
norms are, to use Robert Brandom’s expression, (Brandom, 2002,
p. 216) – outcomes of communicative action established and sustained
by agents’ intersubjective practices. These social achievements get
their normative purchase by virtue of being assented to and acknowl-
edged by a community of agents. Crucially, though, the practice of
assenting to and acknowledging normative constraints and normative
entitlements comprises determining ‘the precise content of those im-
plicit norms … through a ‘process of negotiation’ involving ourselves
and those who attribute norms to us’ (Houlgate, 2007, p. 139). By
virtue of being a process of negotiation, norms are never fixed but
always subject to ‘further assessment, challenge, defence, and correc-
tion’ (Brandom, 1994, p. 647).
(U) concerns the formal, pragmatic procedural justification of
moral norms based on (D). In effect, Habermas construes (U) as
the rational reconstruction of Kant’s supreme principle of morality
in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. As he writes,
[t]he Categorical Imperative is always already in the background
here: the form of a general law legitimates the distribution of
liberties, because it implies that a given law has passed the
universalisation test and been found worthy in the court of
reason. (Habermas, 1996, p. 120)13
Crucially, the Kantian universalisation test aims to establish which
maxims and interests pass deliberative discursive articulation and
challenge such that those maxims and interests are objectively valid
(or universally and equally binding for any rational agent). By exten-
sion, democracy, for Habermas, is a constitutional state model struc-
tured in accordance with the principles of communicative action and
discourse: the laws of a democratic constitutional state are legitimate
insofar as we arrive at them through discursive practices that arewholly
intersubjective and inclusive, since society can only be integrated
peacefully in the long-run if social integration involves communicative
action and discourse.14
In what immediately follows, we examine the vulnerability of
speaking and communicating subjects in light of issues raised or
neglected by Habermas’s account of communicative action. We
take vulnerability to be understood as a multifaceted concept, one
that generally refers to our interdependence as human beings. Here
13 See also Habermas (1996, p. 153).
14 Viz. Habermas (2001).
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vulnerability is understood to be a shared constitutive condition that
evokes our needful openness to others and the open-ended nature of
the human condition; it therefore points to power, injury and suffer-
ing, as much as it does to forms of care, social (inter)action and
cooperation.15 For our purposes, the notion of vulnerability becomes
even more salient when we examine the forms of reciprocity, respon-
siveness and interdependence that we argue underpin Habermas’s
account of language-use, discourse and communicative action.
2.1 Vulnerability and Communication
A number of interpreters have questioned whether Habermas’s
critical theory is up to the task of accounting for various forms of
power and subordination even within the normative account of com-
municative action. We argue that an alternative way of considering
these issues and Habermas’s theory more generally, is through a con-
sideration of the potential vulnerabilities associated with speech and
communicative action, specifically those related to power, injury and
harm.
Thomas McCarthy, Amy Allen, and Nancy Fraser, to name a few,
have drawn attention to the inadequacy of Habermas’s critical theory
in terms of accounting for forms of injury and harm associated with
racial and gender subordination, for example. As Allen puts it, one
major concern is that ‘communicative action screens power out of
the lifeworld’, and as a consequence, adequate consideration is
not given to the forms of subordination that are ‘reproduced in the
lifeworld domains of culture, society and personality’ (Allen, 2007,
p. 641), forms that are subsequently replicated in speech acts.
McCarthy suggests that the resources for tackling these issues
might be more readily found in Habermas’s early work, where he
more fully considers ‘the relation between power, social practices
and subjectivity’ (McCarthy, 2001, p. 654 [cited in Allen (2007)]),
or patterns of socialisation that impact on forms of communicative
interaction. However, when Habermas moves to advance a formal
pragmatic analysis of communication as well as his later theory of
discourse ethics, it seems these insights drop away.
15 This way of phrasing the point is in Petherbridge (2016; 2018); that
work provides a fuller account of the material on vulnerability. Sections of
the material presented here in sections two and four have also been explored
in Petherbridge (2021), but in the context of exploring the notions of recog-
nition and trust.
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Following McCarthy’s insights, Allen suggests that one of the key
problems for Habermas in the development of his formal pragmatics
and later theory of communicative action, is the lack of an account of
socialisation processes in the lifeworld that consequently adversely
impact upon his critical theory of communication. For our purposes,
this also points to one of the key sites of vulnerability in communica-
tive practices more generally. As we will discuss below, this is also
linked to a second but related form of vulnerability in speech prac-
tices, that is, the constitutive power of language in subject-formation,
as well as the inherently vulnerable dynamic between speaker and
hearer in speech acts.
Habermas’s most developed attempt to address the problem of
power and subordination in relation to forms of communication,
can perhaps be found in his account of systematically distorted com-
munication. He briefly discusses this phenomenon in The Theory of
Communicative Action Volume 1, where he describes it as a form of
concealed strategic action. As mentioned above, Habermas claims
that perlocutionary acts represent forms of strategic action given
their intent is to bring about some particular end, rather than
merely a form of communicative action directed toward mutual
understanding. Habermas argues the following:
[systematically distorted] communication pathologies can be
conceived of as the result of a confusion between actions
orientated to reaching understanding and actions orientated to
success. In situations of concealed strategic action, at least one
of the parties behaves with an orientation to success, but leaves
others to believe that all the presuppositions of communicative
action are satisfied. This is the case of manipulation… in connec-
tion with perlocutionary acts… [Furthermore,] [i]n such cases at
least one of the parties is deceiving himself about the fact that he
is acting with an attitude orientated to success and is only keeping
up the appearance of communicative action. (Habermas, 1984,
pp. 332–33)
In other texts, Habermas more directly links the problem of system-
atically distorted communication to the background context of the
lifeworld and the problem of individual development. As Allen
identifies, in his ‘Reflections on Communicative Pathology’ (1974),
Habermas examines the phenomena of systematically distorted com-
munication in regard to both the differentiation and connection
between ‘the external organisation of speech – roughly, its social
context – and the internal organisation of speech – the universal
and necessary presuppositions of communication’ (Allen, 2007,
9












































p. 645). As Allen has argued, this means we might also need to take
account not only of systematically distorted communication but the
forms of distorted subjectivity that arise in individual development
that in turn impact on participants in communication.
For Habermas, though, the consequences of systematically dis-
torted communication refer not only the disruptive effect they have
on the social context in which speech acts take place, but also to the
very ‘validity basis of speech’ itself. In this sense, Allen notes ‘[c]om-
munication becomes systematically distorted when the external
organisation of speech is overburdened, and this burden is shifted
onto the internal organisation of speech’ (Ibid.). This dynamic,
however, occurs ‘surreptitiously’, in Habermas’s view, without
leading to a break in communication or to ‘openly declared … stra-
tegic action’ (Habermas, 2001, p. 147 [cited in Allen (2007)]). The
validity basis of speech is disrupted if at least one of the three univer-
sal validity claims – truth, normative rightness or sincerity – are
violated even though communication nonetheless continues on the
‘presumption’ of it being communicative action orientated to reach-
ing understanding, when in fact it conceals the speaker’s strategic
intent.
In this context, then, we suggest that Habermas’s discussion and
acknowledgement of the phenomena of systematically distorted
communication discloses the kinds of vulnerability inherent not
only in being a participant (speaker or hearer) in a speech act but
also to the vulnerability contained in communicative action
itself. This is the case both in relation to the vulnerabilities inher-
ent to the identity development of subjects who enter into commu-
nicative acts such that the organisation of the social context
impacts on the internal organisation of speech, but also to the vul-
nerability and unpredictability that might play out in speech acts
themselves.
As the discussion of systematically distorted communication
reveals, speech and communication are, then, subject to at least two
kinds of vulnerability. Communicative practices are subject to a
kind of vulnerability that is implicit to speech acts themselves, in
the sense that not only the social context in which speech acts take
place are vulnerable to relations of power relations, injury and
harm, but the very validity of speech becomes vulnerable. As we will
discuss further below, this is played out in the basic dynamics of
speech acts themselves, where there is a vulnerability embedded in
the basic relation between a speaker’s performance and a hearer’s
response, such that certain conditions enable or constrain speech acts
and are impacted upon by the ‘situated identities of the persons’
10












































speaking and hearing.16 In this sense, as Allen suggests, ‘[w]hen 
Habermas relates the concept of systematically distorted communica-
tion to the formation of identity’ (Allen, 2007, p. 645), another 
tension is revealed. This is because for Habermas, as for other critical 
theorists such as Judith Butler and Axel Honneth, identity is consti-
tuted through intersubjective recognition.
However, as both Honneth and Butler reveal, the granting of 
recognition is inherently vulnerable; the intersubjective basis of 
subject-formation creates certain kinds of dependence on 
others but there is no guarantee that recognition will be 
forthcoming or when it might be withheld.As Habermas himself 
identifies, this means that systematically distorted forms of identity 
indicate ‘an asym-metrical distribution of power’, and this dynamic 
is shifted onto the ‘internal structure of speech’ (Habermas, 
2001, p. 147 [cited in Allen (2007)]). However, despite this 
acknowledgment, Habermas does not give due consideration to the 
way in which speech or language itself may also contribute to 
distorted forms of identity (for example, through ‘interpellation’, as 
Butler puts it).
In the preceding discussion, then, we have so far identified the fol-
lowing forms of vulnerability in relation to speech and communication:1. The first manifestation of vulnerability is one associated with
identity-formation, which, for Habermas, can be understood
in terms of recognition. In this regard, we identified the way
in which socialisation processes and forms of power reproduced
in the lifeworld domains of culture, society and personality,
render subjects vulnerable to distorted forms of identity
which in turn impacts upon speech acts. This points not only
to the vulnerability associated with recognition as intrinsic to
subject-formation but to the constitutive power of language
in subject-formation.
2. Such distorted forms of identity-formation may in turn impact
upon the internal organisation of speech, leading to increased
vulnerability. This is not only the case in terms of the social
context in which particular speech acts take place but impacts
on the very validity of speech itself.
3. This may play out directly in speech acts and the vulnerability
associated with being a participant in communicative action, or
in terms of the uncertainty about whether one’s speech act is
successful or not. This form of vulnerability is inherent to
16 Stawarska (2017, p. 185).
17 See Butler (2004).
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the relation between a speaker and listener, particularly in rela-
tion to the dynamic between a speaker’s performance and a
hearer’s uptake.
We will now turn to a more detailed examination of the vulnerability
entailed in the dynamics of speech acts and the potential for disrup-
tion or instability to the meaning and effect of such acts.
2.2 TheVulnerability of Speech Acts: Speaker Performance andHearer
Uptake
As discussed above, Habermas draws on Austin’s analysis of speech
acts in developing his account of communication and discourse,
where the account of illocutionary acts is central to the theory of com-
munication action (and the discourse theory of ethics). However, as
we also saw, vulnerabilities were also identified in relation to inequal-
ity and power that distort the internal organisation of speech.
The interrelation between the performative nature of speech and in-
equality has beenmore fully addressed by philosophers such as Jennifer
Hornsby andRaeLangton. Although these debates have seemingly not
included a discussion of vulnerability as inherent to speech acts, we
wish to draw attention here to this neglected aspect in the discourse
here. Hornsby and Langton have highlighted the way in which, as
speakers, certain people suffer what they term ‘illocutionary silencing’.
As they put it, ‘people are silenced when they are prevented from doing
certain illocutionary things withwords. Peoplewho utter words but fail
to perform the illocution they intendmaybe silenced’ and this produces
what they term ‘illocutionary disablement’. In this scenario, a person’s
speechmaybe said to ‘misfire’ and a person ‘is deprived of illocutionary
potential’ (Hornsby and Langton, 1998, p. 21).
Wewould like to suggest that this kind of illocutionary silencing illus-
trates the kinds of vulnerability inherent to speech acts, and by exten-
sion, to communicative action. If there is uncertainty about whether a
speaker’s speech may misfire or be taken-up by a hearer, this causes
certain vulnerabilities as a participant in communication. Here it is
worth examining the dynamics of the vulnerabilities associated with
illocutionary acts that Hornsby and Langton implicitly allude to in
terms of their account of illocutionary silencing in more detail.
In many respects, Hornsby and Langton’s reading and develop-
ment of Austin’s speech act theory accords with some of the basic in-
terpretations also offered by Habermas. Hornsby and Langton point
to the slightly unstable differentiation Austin marks out between
12












































illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, which in regard to the former,
rest on ‘the saying of certain words such that, in saying those words
one performs an action’, whilst in contrast the latter refers to ‘the
saying of words, such that by saying those words other things are
done’ (Hornsby and Langton, 1998, p. 24). As Hornsby and
Langton remark (Ibid.), however, given that Austin ties illocutionary
acts to a hearer’s uptake, the outcome of the hearer’s responsivity
itself could be deemed a kind of consequence.
Nonetheless, like Habermas, Hornsby and Langton want to retain
a distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. This is
because, in their view, perlocutionary acts are not merely communi-
cative but, ‘introduce the idea of extra-linguistic or incidental conse-
quences of speaking’ (Ibid.), in other words, further actions follow
from such acts that are not attached to the conventions of speech
per se. Importantly, illocutionary speech acts are not only tied to,
what Austin terms, ‘felicity conditions’ associated with certain
formal conditions, conventions and institutions, such as an order,
request or proposal, that ensure the force of a speech act. They are
also related to certain conditions that involve ‘the institution of
language itself’ (Hornsby and Langton, 1998, p. 25). In this regard,
Hornsby and Langton point to the relation of recognition underlying
a speaker and hearer in speech acts and argue that ‘[b]y involving the
hearer as well as the speaker, illocutionary acts reveal language as
communicative’ (Ibid.).
In this sense, the success or otherwise of illocutionary acts relies
upon the hearer’s uptake but more generally also requires mutual
reciprocity and receptiveness of uptake. As they explain,
[u]ptake consists in the speaker being taken to be performing the
very illocutionary act that, in being so taken, she (the speaker) is
performing. Language use then relies in a mutual capacity for
uptake, which involves a minimal receptiveness on the part of
language users in the role of hearers. This minimal receptiveness
does not mean the hearer will agree, or is even capable of agree-
ing, with what a speaker is saying; but it does mean that a hearer
has a capacity to grasp what communicative act a speaker might
intend to perform. (Ibid.)
Ultimately, then, mutual reciprocity is required for a speaker’s utter-
ance to do the work it means to do, and this brings Hornsby and
Langton’s view close to the spirit of Habermas’s account.
However, in certain cases, this dynamic of illocutionary acts fails
because as Hornsby and Langton point out, certain sayings are un-
speakable for certain speakers. Some examples they give are, a man
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who tries to marry by saying ‘I do’, only to discover the celebrant was
merely an unauthorised actor; or a woman living under Islamic law
who wishes to divorce her husband who utters the word ‘divorced’.
These examples represent what Hornsby and Langton refer to as
‘illocutionary disablement’ (Hornsby and Langton, 1998, p. 26), in
which the saying of something misfires as the speaker does not
satisfy certain felicity conditions. Somewhat like Habermas,
Hornsby and Langton refer to the centrality of a hearer’s recognition
of a speaker’s intention in order for a speech act to be successful.
Furthermore, they also point to the importance of reciprocity for
such recognition conditions to bemet. In their view, when reciprocity
is at work, a hearer recognises the speaker’s attempt to perform an
illocution, and the speaker’s attempt is performed. For example, in
the situation of an unwanted sexual advance, a speaker says ‘no’
and the hearer recognises this as a refusal.18 It is precisely when
this kind of reciprocity fails and a speaker’s illocution is not recog-
nised for what it is, that a speaker is exposed to a particular form of
vulnerability as she is unable to do things with words in the
manner of successful illocution.
In a related manner, Rebecca Kukla has also drawn attention to the
way in which a ‘speaker’s membership in an already disadvantaged
social group makes it difficult or impossible for her to employ
discursive conventions in the normal way, with the result that the
performative force of her utterances is distorted in ways that
enhance disadvantage’ (Kukla, 2014, p. 441).19 However, Kukla
questions how convincing it is to maintain a strict differentiation
between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. The argument is
that sometimes the full force or consequences of an illocutionary
act are not known or do not materialise in the act of speaking itself.
Rather, as Kukla points out, recognition of the Other as a speaker
as well as the form of responsiveness required for hearer uptake,
in their view, do not seem solely intrinsic to illocution but are a
perlocutionary effect.
The claim is that it is not really until people respond to a speech act
that it can be deemed fully completed. It is only at this point that the
effects of a speech act are really known, and in Kukla’s view, this
needs to be considered an ‘integral part of the entire context of the ut-
terance’ (Kukla, 2014, p. 454). In other words, various norms and
conventions contribute to determining not only whether a speaker
is entitled to speak, but ‘in placing that performance in social space
18 Viz. Hornsby and Langton, 1998, pp. 27–28.
19 Quill Kukla writes as Rebecca Kukla. See references for details.
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after it is complete’ (Kukla, 2014, p. 443). Moreover, certain sayings
or wordsmight be ‘out of one’s control’ and vulnerable towhatKukla
helpfully terms a form of ‘discursive injustice’ (Kukla, 2014, p. 445;
441). As Kukla explains, ‘[v]ictims of discursive injustice are, in
virtue of their disadvantaged social identities, less able to skilfully ne-
gotiate and deploy discursive convention as tools for communication
and action than others’ (Kukla, 2014, p. 445). In this regard, Kukla
draws attention not only to the recognition condition of a speech
act that underpins Hornsby and Langton’s view of the necessity of
the recognition of a speaker’s intention, but also to the impact such
an act has in social space more generally.20
The types of illocutionary silencing that Hornsby and Langton
name, and the notion of discursive injustice that Kukla highlights,
not only demonstrate the vulnerability of speech and communication,
but also have affinities with forms of epistemic injustice and discur-
sive abuse, as we will discuss in Section 3.
However, before discussing these connections, it is important to
consider the way in which a hearer might alternatively be vulnerable
to injury and harm by way of a speaker’s illocution, such that the vul-
nerability of the hearer is enhanced rather than that of the speaker. As
Beata Stawarska suggests, a hearer’s uptake not only enables a speech
act to function but also ‘plays an active role in shaping power relations’
(Stawarska, 2017, p. 186), which points to the vulnerable dynamic in-
volved in unjust speech. On one side, as Stawarska argues, some
‘sayings have the potential to produce massive harm’ (Stawarska,
2017, p. 185) that may or may not be intended, and on the other
side, ‘[l]anguage users can re-shape the social world by being active lis-
teners to those who have historically been disempowered’ (Stawarska,
2017, p. 186), and whose illocutions often remain unrecognised. As
Stawarska, suggests, ‘we therefore need to expand the horizon’ of com-
municative acts, ‘to include the inherited social conditions of power
and the received histories of the said words and the situated identities
of the person’s saying and hearing them’ (Stawarska, 2017, p. 185).
Austin had already pointed to the way in which only those persons
delegated with authority could successfully perform certain illocut-
ionary acts, recognising that such authority whether celebrant or di-
vorcee, is underwritten by an entire social order. However, Stawarska
argues that historically disempowered or de-authorised groups can
also come to ‘make words speak somewhat differently than they did
in the past’ (Stawarska, 2017, p. 190). This requires recognising
that linguistic meanings and language use are themselves vulnerable
20 Viz. Kukla (2014, p. 444).
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to change, in the sense that they have a certain ‘socially contingent
plasticity’ (Ibid.) that has the potential to rupture inherited and sedi-
mented meanings and usage.
There is, then, a two-pronged response to the phenomena of
disempowered communicative participants: (1) there is what
Stawarska, following Butler, refers to as the ‘transgressive reclam-
ation of socially harmful speech’ by re-orientating the use and signi-
fication of certain words. In this manner, harmful or injurious speech
can be turned around such that it becomes ‘an empowering emanci-
patory practice’ (Ibid.). This is the case with words such as ‘queer’ or
‘black’. In such cases, subordinated groups are themselves ‘empow-
ered to negotiate what words signify and what effects they may
produce’ (Ibid.). Thus, where once the saying of particular words
might have been injurious, in the act of reclaiming them, disempow-
ered groups are able to re-orientate the meaning and the affects that
words produce in a self-affirming manner, and this also shifts the
authority problem in linguistic encounters.21 (2) Extending insights
from Hornsby and Langton, this shift not only requires an alteration
in terms of who has authority to speak, but also requires a form of
‘active heeding’ that enables forms of ‘re-authorisation’ (Ibid.).
Thus, akin to Hornsby and Langton, as Stawarska argues, the
‘process of re-authorisation vitally depends on cultivating a stance
of productive listening that empowers the utterance to become felici-
tous by virtue of the recognition it bestows upon the speaker’
(Stawarska, 2017, p. 192).
Thus, the kind of vulnerability wewish to highlight is played out at
what Stawarska terms the ‘micro-level’ of linguistic encounters, and
this is particularly impacted by power relations between communica-
tive partners to interaction.22 The forms of vulnerability we refer to,
then, include not only forms of injury and harm that can be inflicted
through speech acts, but also the uncertainty and unpredictability of
the receptive uptake of a hearer to the illocutionary acts of subordi-
nated groups, as well as the vulnerability of the meaning of such
speech acts themselves, which might be resisted, reclaimed, and
negotiated.23 Taking-up and extending the insights discussed above
in relation to the notions of illocutionary silencing and discursive
injustice, in what immediately follows, we focus on elaborating
epistemic pathologies in the context of epistemic oppression and
testimonial injustice.
21 Viz. Stawarska (2017, p. 190).
22 Viz. Stawarska (2017, p. 191).
23 See Stawarska (2017, p. 191).
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3. Epistemic Pathologies: EpistemicOppression&Testimonial
Injustice
Epistemic oppression refers to, as Kristie Dotson writes, ‘a persistent
and unwarranted infringement on the ability to utilise persuasively
shared epistemic resources that hinders one’s contributions to knowl-
edge production’ (Dotson, 2014, p. 115). According to Dotson, sys-
temic practices of epistemic exclusion and oppression result in
positions and communities that produce deficiencies in social knowl-
edge, as evidenced by increasingly widespread, normalised virulent
epistemic contempt for non-privileged groups. For example, distress
at systemically reproduced institutional racism and police brutality is
often dismissed, to the extent that the vocabulary of protest against
racial oppression is viciously misrecognised to the point of erasure.
As Robert Gooding-Williams writes, the reactionary view is ‘a
failure to regard the speech or actions of black people as manifesting
thoughtful judgements about issues that concern all members of the
political community’ (Gooding-Williams, 2006, p. 14).
Black Lives Matter demonstrations typically involve the chant
‘Hands Up, Don’t Shoot!’, where marchers raise their hands above
their heads while chanting, as part of the effort to explicitly challenge
the reactionary socio-epistemic paradigms which construe antiracist
protestors as public threats. To quote José Medina here, ‘[t]his
slogan performatively challenges the misplaced presumption that
demonstrators pose a threat to public order, interrogating the under-
lying narratives that depict them as such a threat, while invoking
alternative images of peaceful expressions of group agency’
(Medina, 2018, p. 12). Furthermore, the chants ‘Whose streets?
Our streets!’ and ‘No Justice, No Peace!’ are deliberately misinter-
preted and misrecognised by reactionary groups to imply that the
basic progressive claim ‘black lives matter’ is equivalent to ‘black
lives matter more than white lives’. Crucially, this forms a significant
part of the explanation for why #AllLivesMatter is in fact reaction-
ary, since #AllLivesMatter reveals itself as ignorant of structural
racism and systemic misrecognition.
Related to, but conceptually and politically distinct from the
concept of epistemic oppression, which is principally concerned
with endemic patterns of structural exploitation and domination of
specific epistemic communities, is the concept of epistemic injustice.
To quoteMiranda Fricker, epistemic injustice arises when a person is
‘wronged in their capacity as a knower’ (Fricker, 2007, p. 20). Such
wronging usually happens in at least two ways: (1) through testimo-
nial injustice, which typically occurs when a speaker’s assertions are
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given less credibility than they deserve because the hearer has preju-
dices about a social group of which the speaker is a member;24
(2) through hermeneutical injustice, which occurs when there is a
gap in the collective interpretive resources of a given society that
leaves a marginalised and socially powerless group unable to properly
make sense of their social powerlessness. Crucially, the epistemic
pathologies of misrecognising or not recognising individual knowl-
edge-claims and/or social group knowledge-claims are particularly
vicious forms of humiliation, in that they are a ‘deformation of the
normal human capacity for the evaluative perception of others’
(Zurn, 2015, p. 101).
With regard to the kind of epistemic pathology of recognition in the
context of testimonial injustice, in particular (for our specific focus
here), it would be helpful to refer to Patricia Williams’s autobio-
graphical account of her experience of testimonial justice:
I was shopping in Soho [in Benetton’s] and saw a sweater that I
wanted to buy for my mother. I pressed my round brown face to
the window and my finger to the buzzer, seeking admittance. A
narrow-eyed, white teenager … glared out, evaluating me for
signs that would pit me against the limits of his social under-
standing. After about five seconds, he mouthed ‘We’re closed’,
and blew pink rubber at me. It was two Saturdays before
Christmas, at one o’clock in the afternoon; there were several
white people in the store who appeared to be shopping for
things for their mothers. I was enraged … In the flicker of his
judgemental grey eyes, that sales-child had transformed my
brightly sentimental, joy-to-the-world, pre-Christmas spree to
a shambles … [H]is refusal to let me into the store … was an
outward manifestation of his never having let someone like me
into the realm of his reality … (Williams, 1991, pp. 44–56)
A rumour got started that the Benetton’s story wasn’t true, that
I had made it up, that it was a fantasy, a lie that was probably the
product of a diseased mind trying to make all white people feel
guilty. At this point I realised … that the greater issue I had to
face was the overwhelming weight of a disbelief that goes
beyond mere disinclination to believe and becomes active sup-
pression of anything I might have to say. The greater problem
is a powerfully oppressive mechanism for denial of self-knowl-
edge and expression. And this denial cannot be separated from
24 See Davis (2016) and Giladi (forthcoming) for how credibility excess
is an act of epistemic injustice.
18












































the simultaneously pathological willingness to believe certain
things about blacks – not believe them, but things about them.
(Ibid., p. 242)
In addition to being harmed by the salesperson’s racism – Williams
was racially barred from entry and consequently could not participate
in the activity of buying Christmas presents for one’s mother –
Williams suffered a distinct, further wrong by having her testimony
dismissed and not accorded serious communicative status.
Specifically, in the Habermasian sense of validity claims involved
with those speech acts conveying truthfulness and, above all, reveal-
ing and baring the subjective world of individual anxieties, hopes (and
the like) to one’s listener(s), Williams, rather than automatically
receive the default level of epistemic respect, trust, and communica-
tive appreciation provided by the Acceptance Principle,25 is not only
treated with epistemic scorn, she is also stripped of any normative au-
thority. She is deemed as someone who violates the communicative
norms of assertion. As such Williams’s capacity for speech is violated
– where, crucially, speech involves the vulnerability that comes with
revealing oneself in the transparent communicative act of sharing
sincere propositional content for uptake by the listener. This is
why racism – at the epistemic level – is structured around the patho-
logical norm of believing untrue things about black people, rather
than believing black people about true things.
Testimonial injustice deprives Williams, a rational agent, of her
rightful place as someone moving in the communicative space of
reasons, and thereby leaves individuals like her who are systemically
prejudiced against in a state of self-alienation and double-conscious-
ness: Williams is forcibly alienated from her own speech and ration-
ality, where these enable her to be a member of a community of
inquirers and reliable narrators. As part of her self-conscious identi-
fication with fellowAfrican-Americans in anAfrican-American com-
munity, Williams communicatively self-interprets and finds such
communicative action empowering. However, African-Americans
(and other people of colour), as part of a racist world, are met with ex-
ternal and hostile web of meanings that radically distort such uplift-
ing local self-conceptions. The power structure of racial oppression is
pervasive such that the experiential relation Williams has to herself
becomes distorted by how she views her agency from the perspective
of white prejudicial attitudes, which aim to rob her of her position as a
communicative subject, and instead treat her as an object of derision
25 See Burge (1993, p. 467).
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and contempt. This is what we take her to mean when she argues that
‘the greater problem is a powerfully oppressive mechanism for denial
of self-knowledge and expression’. Crucially, the asymmetrical
nature of the cognitive environment causes Williams to think and
feel that the space of reasons, where communicative practices derive
their sense of meaning and purpose, is not a space for her.
Given that epistemic oppression and testimonial injustice cause
one to be alienated from both their own communicative rationality
and from the speech-based practices which necessarily constitute dis-
course between peers, exclusion from the space of reasons amounts to
‘discursive abuse’. The experience of discursive abuse ‘carries with it
the danger of an injury that can bring the identity of the person as a
whole to the point of collapse’ (Honneth, 1995, pp. 132–33), where
the identity under threat here is a person’s self-interpretation as agen-
tial,26 since speech involves vulnerability with respect to revealing
oneself in the transparent, trusting communicative act of sharing
propositional content for uptake by the listener. To use Andrea
Lobb’s expression, the kind of ‘epistemic injury’ (Lobb, 2018, p. 1)
endured here can be made sense of in relation to what Richard
Rorty calls ‘mute despair’ and ‘intense mental pain’. For Rorty,
this notion of agential pain – the type of pain unique to agents
– reminds us that human beings who have been socialised … can
all be given a special kind of pain: they can all be humiliated by the
forcible tearing down of the particular structures of language and
belief in which they were socialised (or which they pride them-
selves on having formed for themselves). (Rorty, 1989, p. 177)
The failure to properly recognise and accord somebody the epistemic
acknowledgement they merit is an act of abuse in the sense of forcibly
depriving individuals of a progressive communicative environment in
which the epistemic recognition accorded to them plays a significant
role in enabling and fostering their self-confidence as a communicative
agent. This includes:
i. External and forcible control over one’s own communicative
integrity.
ii. Violation of communicative integrity prevents one from
trusting others and one’s own capacities to the distressing
extent that victims internalise culpability.
iii. Discursive abuse represents a type of disrespect that does
lasting damage to one’s basic confidence that one can
26 Cf. Fricker (2007, p. 55).
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autonomously coordinate one’s own communicative claims
and even identify as a communicative subject or be recog-
nised as one.
Understood in this manner, there is compelling reason to see how all
three points above relate to the vulnerability associated with a) iden-
tity-formation, b) distorted identity-formation and the internal organ-
isation of speech, and c) being a participant in communicative action,
where c) especially concerns the dynamic between a speaker’s perform-
ance and a hearer’s uptake. Regressive recognition orders deliberately
exploit intersubjective vulnerability andpervert communicative dynam-
ics by making those excluded from the space of reasons think and feel as
though their rejection is entirely the result of their failings. Epistemic
oppression and systemic testimonial injustice permeate, to the extent
that individuals and/or social groups are made to blame themselves
for not being deemed worthy enough to be afforded credibility.27
4 Spreading One’s Dreams at the Feet of the Other: Habermas
and the Fragility of Communicating Subjects
The preceding discussion of illocutionary acts and silencing, as well
as discursive injustice and abuse, raises questions about the neglected
element of vulnerability inherent in being a participant in speech acts
and more fully in communicative action. In turn, the vulnerability of
participants in communicative action, flows through to the vulner-
ability of persons as knowers and participants in the space of
reasons. What, then, do we draw from the above discussion in
regard to the interrelation between vulnerability, speech and commu-
nication as it pertains to Habermas’s work? In what follows, we con-
clude by considering, on the one hand, the manner in which an
account of vulnerability enriches Habermas’s overly formal notions
of communicative action and discourse; on the other, we examine
the ways in which Habermas’s own account of communicative
action is already oriented towards the vulnerability of speaking
agents. This is evinced not only through the rules of communication
and discourse that he goes to such lengths to construct, but also in
claims he makes in regard to moral intuitions and discourse ethics.
As we have seen, Habermas builds an account of normativity and
recognition into his theory of communicative action and discourse.
27 For previous articulations of these points in section three, see Giladi
(2018, 2020).
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Implicitly, the formal structure of Habermas’s theory of discourse
and notion of the ‘ideal speech situation’, already acknowledges the
vulnerability of speaking agents by providing measures aimed to
protect persons in the realm of communicative action. His account
of language-use points to what he regards as our primordial inter-
dependence as language-users and the basic uncertainty of this en-
deavour. The account of the ideal speech situation makes a claim
for equality of speaking-agents by having the opportunity to speak
and to express one’s viewpoint without coercion or interference.
Moreover, Habermas argues for the need for free and equal argumen-
tation and the use of reason in practical discourse, with the view to
reaching mutual understanding and fostering mutual cooperation.
However, he does not assume this process is seamless. Rather, he
points to the fragilities and uncertainties of communicative
freedom that arise with modernity due to particular developmental
logics or dynamics (the decoupling of ‘Lifeworld’ and ‘System’28),
which in turn impact upon the internal structure of communicative
action and the potential for rationality.
Notably, Habermas explicitly ties his account of discourse to a
notion of vulnerability in texts such as Moral Consciousness and
Communicative Action. In this text, he restates that ‘[a]rgumentation
insures that all concerned in principle take part, freely and equally, in
a cooperative search for truth, where nothing coerces anyone except
the force of the better argument’ (Habermas, 1990, p. 198).
However, what is significant in this account is that Habermas also
makes clear the anthropological claim underlying his discursive ap-
proach as it pertains to moral intuitions. As he writes:
Moral intuitions are intuitions that instruct us on how best to
behave in situations where is it in our power to counteract the
extreme vulnerability of others by being thoughtful and consid-
erate. In anthropological terms, morality is a safety device com-
pensating for a vulnerability built into the sociocultural form of
life. (Habermas, 1990, p. 199)
Here, it might be suggested, that Habermas makes clear that his
theory of communicative action is in fact underpinned by a constitu-
tive notion of vulnerability that is inherent to every social and
28 Habermas makes a distinction between what he terms the ‘Lifeworld’,
which refers the normatively underpinned public sphere as well as the private
sphere of family life, in contrast towhat he terms ‘System’, which includes the
State and the activities of market capitalism steered by purely formal or
instrumental mechanisms. See Habermas (1987a).
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intersubjective context. It also brings Habermas within the vicinity
of other vulnerability theorists when he ties this notion of vulnerabil-
ity to our constitutive interdependence as human beings and to forms
of subject-formation dependent upon recognition from others. For,
as he states: ‘[t]hemore the subject becomes individuated, themore he
becomes entangled in a densely woven fabric of mutual recognition,
that is, of reciprocal exposedness and vulnerability’ (Habermas, 1990,
p. 199).
InHabermas’s view, then, moralities address or respond towhat he
terms the ‘fragility of human beings individuated through socialisa-
tion’ (Habermas, 1990, p. 200). But the protection of these fragilities
requires a two-pronged approach that safeguards not only the indi-
vidual subject but also the community in which that subject is em-
bedded in a web of ‘intersubjective relations of recognition’ (Ibid.).
These two elements point to two related principles that Habermas
terms ‘justice’ and ‘solidarity’, and as he sees it, both principles are
rooted in ‘the specific vulnerability of the human species, which in-
dividuates itself through sociation’ (Ibid.). In this respect, we argue
that Habermas’s theory should be taken seriously as a contribution
to the discourse on vulnerability, particularly as it pertains to the ne-
glected elements of speech and communication. In the essay
‘Morality and Ethical Life’, he even goes so far to say that ‘linguistic-
ally mediated interaction, is both the reason for the vulnerability of
socialised individuals and the key resource they possess to compensate
for that vulnerability’ (Habermas, 1990, p. 201). It is clear, then,
that Habermas acknowledges that forms of vulnerability are inherent
to speech and linguistically mediated interaction as well as to individ-
ual subject-development.
However, despite this anthropological claim in regard to linguistic
forms of vulnerability, the way in which Habermas addresses this
issue is ironically conceptualised at a rather formal and abstract
level. As a consequence, he does not take adequate account of the
more embodied, pre-reflexive and affective forms of interaction that
characterise much of the literature in vulnerability theory. Indeed,
even in his early work, Habermas’s theory is based on the assumption
that certain procedural rules are always already presupposed by
human discourse and that these rules can be drawn on to validate
moral principles, and thus normatively justify social interaction.
Under this schema, rational consensus presupposes an ideal speech
situation as a kind of meta-norm, a situation that significantly
assumes a kind of symmetry and reciprocity, requiring all partici-
pants to adopt the standpoint of the ‘generalised other’. In assuming
this standpoint, though, participants must abstract from their
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individuality and concrete identity, thereby leaving behind their
private and particular affiliations, and the specific social context in
which they are embedded.29 Through such a principle, Habermas
suggests a rational consensus can be achieved in the context of con-
flicting opinions and interests regardless of differing traditions, cul-
tural perspectives, or individual life-histories.
In order to make this claim, though, Habermas’s moral theory
relies upon a distinction he makes between issues of justice (morality)
and questions of the good life (ethics), based upon a postmetaphysical
argument shared with John Rawls’s liberal egalitarianism (1971;
1985) that ontological questions must be separated from practical
matters if the universalist normative presuppositions of communica-
tive rationality are to succeed. In this respect, in Habermas’s view,
moral judgements are concerned only with right or just action, not
with substantive values of the good or characteristics that pertain to
individual needs and identities; only claims about rightness and
just action are considered to provide norms that are obligatory for
all persons universally and equally.30 As a consequence, Habermas
concludes that moral-practical dilemmas can be resolved on the
basis of a universal sense of communicative reason, whereas questions
relating to ethical identities can only be considered in terms of the
ethical values within a particular form of life.
However, as Honneth, for example, has argued, normative claims
are experienced and articulated by people in everyday life as distur-
bances that may, or may not, make mutual recognition possible
prior to them reaching the level of discourse. These disturbances
may therefore disclose the processes through which recognition is,
or is not, achieved prior to the articulation of moral norms.
Consequently, these are processes and conditions that individuals
must feel are safeguarded even before they can attain the competency
considered necessary by a theory of discourse ethics. In this respect,
then, the Habermasian form of moral reasoning, as the impartial
application of general principles, describes a restricted field of
moral life concerned with public institutional forms of morality,
but which, ironically ignore everyday motivational contexts despite
their explicitly pragmatic orientation.31 The universalist principle
of Habermas’s discourse ethics demands from interaction partners
29 See Benhabib (1986). For a full account of the argument outlined
here, see Petherbridge (2013).
30 See Rehg (1994).
31 Viz. Honneth (1995). See also Petherbridge (2013) a full account of
this argument.
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a willingness and refined ability to enable consideration of normative
questions from a generalised standpoint whilst leaving aside their
concrete relations with others in everyday experience.32 However,
such claims address dilemmas in social life that are not located at
the abstract level of universalisation, but at the concrete level at
which everyday forms of conflict occur. The proceduralism of
Habermas’s discourse theory and his overly formal account of lin-
guistic action, therefore, means it is difficult to theorise how the
initial feelings of injury that motivate moral claims are converted into
propositional attitudes (articulated linguistic claims) in the first place.
As the above discussion of Allen revealed, it is then not only amatter
of identifying forms of systematically distorted communication but
equally forms of systematically distorted identity-formation that
impact upon forms of communication. Thus, as Honneth and Allen
have noted, normative criteria must not only be concerned with the
intersubjective presuppositions of language but also the intersubject-
ive presuppositions of human identity development that impact upon
speech, communication, and the social scaffolding of the knower.
Moreover, as Honneth identifies, Habermas’s theory is also suscep-
tible to the ‘cultural exclusion’ of oppressed social classes from the ar-
ticulation of claims of injustice in the public sphere. Honneth draws
attention to the silencing of forms of moral conflict or social feelings
of injustice, that as he expresses it in early work, ‘lie behind the
façade of late-capitalist integration’ (Honneth, 1995, p. 207).
This critique is aimed at Habermas’s particular model of society
and the public sphere, which unwittingly results in the exclusion of
certain voices and forms of moral protest from the public field of speech
and communicative action; in other words, Habermas’s model fails
to make sufficient sense of this type of discursive abuse, where such
forms of discursive abuse reinforce the structural (epistemic) obsta-
cles facing certain voices and forms of moral protest. These structural
(epistemic) obstacles prevent certain voices and forms of moral
protest from being publicly articulable and from becoming fully ela-
borated moral claims (Honneth, 1995, p. 207; p. 209). In this
manner, forms of exclusion are related to deprivation of ‘linguistic
and symbolic means’ (Honneth, 1995, p. 213), and this creates not
only misrecognition and silencing, but the invisibilisation of disad-
vantaged groups. Indeed, what particularly motivates the inquiries
of intersectional feminist epistemologists is precisely the focus on
(i) the power dynamics of gender, race, class, sexuality, and disability;
(ii) the role these dynamics of power play in the social conditions of
32 Viz. Benhabib (1986, pp. 320–21).
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knowing; and (iii) the ways in which the structures of existing social
institutions affect the actual practices of knowers. As indicated above,
intersectional feminist epistemologists are particularly concerned
with (i) how the normative space of reasons is organised; (ii) how
one negotiates the normative space of reasons; and (iii) how one
gets into normative space at all. To put this more simply, the overrid-
ing focus is critically uncovering the substantive link between various
types of power relations and epistemic practices. Arguably, the
central question is ‘who gets to know things?’.
One problem, then, with Habermas’s ‘linguistification’ of moral
conflict and his account of justice, is that it potentially contributes
to the very forms of silencing it seeks to overcome. This is due not
only to the formal nature of his pragmatics but also implicit assump-
tions about the skills and capacities required for individuals and
groups to enter into moral debate and discourse in the first place.
Moreover, Habermas’s account of communicative action and dis-
course relies upon certain democratic and discursively structured in-
stitutions and forms of political life. Here Habermas points to an
important issue: communication free from power and distortion re-
quires the establishment of robust modern democratic institutions,
ones that are constituted through reciprocal relations and patterns
of interaction. Such institutions must be underpinned by forms of re-
ciprocal freedom that are grounded in relations of recognition. For
such institutions to ensure forms of communicative action without
coercion theymust be immanently constituted fromwithin the struc-
ture of recognition relations, or to put it another way, they must
develop out of normative patterns of social interaction between
social actors themselves in any given social context.33
Unfortunately, many existing modern institutions fall well short of
the standards of Habermasian discourse and forms of recognition:
they tend to have exclusionary epistemic habits and reveal a normal-
ised contempt for non-privileged agents. To put this point more po-
lemically, many existing modern institutions fail to be relational
institutions, since they fail to promote practices of symmetrical recog-
nition in communication; many institutions have substantive internal
structural weaknesses; they often fail to encourage the quest for self-
realisation and thereby leave people who are epistemically oppressed
and marginalised in a constant state of alienation; many existing
modern institutions, therefore, require radical change, rather than
liberal tweaks. The goal of social critique, therefore, is to identify
and shift unequal power relations that are directly responsible for
33 See Honneth (2014).
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forms of suffering and alienation that are produced by marginalisa-
tion and thereby further entrench forms of oppression.
On this score, Habermas’s theory offers insights into the ways in
which such institutions might be structured democratically in a
manner that enables equal participation in communicative inter-
action. For, as Simone Chambers points out, in principle, discourse
ethics combats the ‘marketplace of ideas between elites in which in-
terests and understandings compete with each other for domination’
(Chambers, 1995, p. 176). Habermas’s discourse theory (in principle)
offers a model for mutual cooperation precisely through the acknowl-
edgement of difference. These discursive spaces, however, can be
opened up further by extending ‘opportunities to participate, by in-
cluding excluded voices, by democratising media access, by setting
up ‘town meetings’, by politicising the depoliticised, by empowering
the powerless, by decentralising decision-making … and so on’
(Chambers, 1995, pp. 176–77). These are all measures that might re-
invigorate practices of discourse that are at the heart of Habermas’s
democratic project and address the fragilities associated not only
with being a participant in communicative action but also inter-
dependent subjects who rely upon recognition from others.
For as we have argued, participants in communication lay them-
selves bare in front of one another, and as Habermas suggests, there
is an implicit trust built into communication that aims at reaching un-
derstanding. By drawing attention to the structure of communication
with respect to the subjective world, Habermas highlights the need
for the recognition of the intentions of the speaker in acts of commu-
nication. In doing so, he acknowledges the forms of interdependence,
reciprocity and responsiveness that are intrinsic to vulnerability in a
manner that might evoke an account of the intentions of the horizon-
tally ‘inclined’, rather than vertically ‘autonomous’ speaker, to use
Adriana Cavarero’s terms.34
The desire to transform the practices of many existing modern in-
stitutionsby recognisingandembracingvulnerabilitycrucially reminds
us of precisely what we owe to one another. As evoked by the passage
from Yeats with which this paper began, as communicating subjects,
we ‘spread our dreams’ before one another thereby placing our trust
in the other’s moral responsiveness. Acknowledging the vulnerable
dynamics of discourse advances democratic forms of association by
fostering the protection of the individual as well as ‘the well-being
of the community to which he [or she] belongs’ (Habermas, 1990,
p. 200). As Habermas writes in one of his more recognitive
34 See Cavarero (2016).
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moments, as ‘creatures’ constituted by ‘profound vulnerability’ we
require communicative forms of moral attentiveness by which we
can defend both ‘the integrity of the individual’ and preserve ‘the
vital ties of mutual recognition through which individuals recipro-
cally stabilise their fragile identities’ (Habermas, 1990, p. 199;
200). Embracing mutual vulnerability, then, has the potential to
provide the indispensable symbolic and material space for bringing
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